The Kyoto Protocol: an Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation.
Calling upon both positive and normative economics, the authors attempt to characterize the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change.
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chander, P. ; Tulkens, H. ; Van Ypersele, J.-P. ; Willems, S. |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | GAME THEORY | ECONOMIC THEORY | ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION | CLIMATE |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by subject
-
China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime
Carraro, Carlo, (2003)
-
Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
Buchner, Barbara, (2003)
-
Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs.A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-up Climate Regimes
Carraro, Carlo, (2005)
- More ...
Similar items by person