The kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and beyond: an economic and game theoretical exploration and interpretation
Year of publication: |
2011-10-28
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Authors: | CHANDER, Parkash ; TULKENS, Henry |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | international environmental agreements | climate change | Kyoto Protocol | applied game theory | applied microeconomics |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2011051 |
Classification: | Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters ; Q58 - Government Policy ; F20 - International Factor Movements and International Business. General ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
Source: |
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Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol
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Strategic behavior in IEAs: When and why countries joined the Kyoto Protocol
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