The limits of tax and expenditure limits : TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Seljan, Ellen C. |
Published in: |
Public choice. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0048-5829, ZDB-ID 207597-0. - Vol. 159.2014, 3/4, p. 485-501
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Subject: | Agency theory | Delegation | Fiscal constitutions | Policy implementation | State and local public finance | Tax and expenditure limitis | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Theorie | Theory | Öffentliche Ausgaben | Public expenditure | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation | Finanzverfassung | Fiscal constitution | Steuerpolitik | Tax policy |
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Buchanan, James M., (2000)
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The limits of tax and expenditure limits: TEL implementation as a principal-agent problem
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