The Macroeconomics of Child Labor Regulation
We develop a positive theory of the adoption of child labor laws. Workers who compete with children in the labor market support a child labor ban, unless their own working children provide a large fraction of family income. Fertility decisions lock agents into specific political preferences, and multiple steady states can arise. The introduction of child labor laws can be triggered by skill-biased technological change, which induces parents to choose smaller families. The theory can account for the observation that, in Britain, regulations were first introduced after a period of rising wage inequality, and coincided with rapid fertility decline.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Doepke, Matthias ; Zilibotti, Fabrizio |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 95.2005, 5, p. 1492-1524
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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