The microfoundations of rules vs. discretion
Using anN-person model, I explore the microfoundations of benevolent rules-dominant situations (of which the familiar time inconsistency models are examples). I show that under discretion the citizens confront a prisoner's dilemma, and I discuss the similar dilemmas embedded in the time inconsistency models. I then suggest new solutions to benevolent rules dominance: suboptimality can be avoided by accepting the discretionary regime and applying to the citizen population the standard remedies to the prisoner's dilemma. Copyright George Mason University 1990
Year of publication: |
1990
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Authors: | Klein, Daniel |
Published in: |
Constitutional Political Economy. - Springer, ISSN 1043-4062. - Vol. 1.1990, 3, p. 1-19
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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