The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective

This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Brown, Alessio J. G. ; Merkl, Christian ; Snower, Dennis J.
Publisher:	Kiel : Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Subject:	minimum wage \| labor market \| employment \| unemployment \| job offer \| job acceptance

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Series:	Kiel Working Paper ; 1906
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	778071804 [GVK] hdl:10419/92368 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:1906 [RePEc]
Classification:	J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332009