The Moral Hazard of Contract Drafting
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Zacks, Eric A. |
Publisher: |
[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (44 p) |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 17, 2015 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.2399875 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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