The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions
Year of publication: |
2008-04-20
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Authors: | Athias, Laure ; Nunez, Antonio |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Winner’s curse | Common value auction | Public Private Partnerships | incomplete contract |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | H57 - Procurement ; H54 - Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock ; L51 - Economics of Regulation ; H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse in Toll Road Concessions: An Empirical Analysis
Athias, Laure, (2006)
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Athias, Laure, (2009)
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Optimal concession of water services under common value
Salanié, François, (2006)
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Athias, Laure, (2009)
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Cultural Biases in Public Service Delivery: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Approach
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Political accountability, incentives, and Contractual design of public private partnerships
Athias, Laure, (2007)
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