The Mythical Benefit of Shareholder Control

Several commentators, most notably Harvard law professor Lucian Bebchuk, have called for greater shareholder control over public firms. Yet an extensive academic literature suggests that shareholders enjoy net benefits from board governance. Why, then, do so many observers believe shareholders should be given greater influence over boards?

MoreLess

Year of publication:	[2009]
Authors:	Stout, Lynn A.
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (6 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	In: Regulation, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 42-47, Spring 2007
Classification:	D21 - Firm Behavior ; D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy ; E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G19 - General Financial Markets. Other ; G23 - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012767103