The Nash Equilibrium requires strong cooperation

Contrary to the customary view that the celebrated Nash-equilibrium theorem in Game Theory is paradigmatic for non-cooperative games, it is shown that, in fact, it is essentially based on a particularly strong cooperation assumption. Furthermore, in practice, this cooperation assumption is simply unrealistic.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Rosinger, Elemer Elad
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	non-cooperation \| strong cooperation \| mixup in the Nash equilibrium

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; C71 - Cooperative Games ; A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784945