The Negative Effects of Petroleum Gaming on Nigeria’s Institutional and Legal Regimes
The central goal of this paper is to unmask the fundamental reasons for the ineffectiveness of all the Nigerian laws that are supposed to regulate and control the oil and gas enterprises. The first part of this paper presents the game theory effects which weigh the parties' rational choices leading to perpetual losing position of the Nigerian government to the effect the loser in the game is compelled to lower standards and weaken her laws to accommodate the winners' investment preferences. It argues that, the irrational choice of the Nigerian government which creates laxity in the laws to accommodate the oil companies is a race to the bottom with consequential permanent damages to the growth and development of the national economy. Among others, the paper highlights the effect of weak regulatory regime on profit oil, royalty receipts and environmental protections. It recommends that, Nigeria should develop local manpower and task the universities to produce indigenous personnel capable of replacing the foreign corporations in the oil and gas sector
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | Kingston, Kato Gogo |
Other Persons: | Frank-Igwe, Uzodinma (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Nigeria | Erdölindustrie | Oil industry | Institutionelle Infrastruktur | Institutional infrastructure | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (9 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Port Harcourt Journal of Business Law Vol. 6(1) 2019 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 12, 2019 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012888775