The Never-a-Weak-Best-Response Test in Infinite Signaling Games
Year of publication: |
1997
|
---|---|
Authors: | Manelli, Alejandro M. |
Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 74.1997, 1, p. 152-173
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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