The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Diehl, Christoph ; Kuzmics, Christoph |
Published in: |
International journal of game theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-1270, ZDB-ID 1459207-1. - Vol. 50.2021, 4, p. 911-925
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Subject: | Cheap talk | Communication | Information transmission | Robustness | Kommunikation | Informationsverbreitung | Information dissemination | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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