The Nonatomic Assignment Model.
We formulate a model with a continuum of individuals to be assigned to a continuum of different positions which is an extension of the finite housing market version due to Shapley and Shubik. We show that optimal solutions to such a model exist and have properties similar to those established for finite models, namely, an equivalence among the following: (1) optimal solutions to the linear programming problem (and its dual) associated with the assignment model; (2) the core of the associated market game; and (3) the Walrasian equilibria of the associated market economy.
Year of publication: |
1992
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Authors: | Gretsky, Neil E ; Ostroy, Joseph M ; Zame, William R |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 2.1992, 1, p. 103-27
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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