The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments.
We prove the nonemptiness of the core of a continuum game without side payments where only small coalitions--ones bounded in absolute size of finite cardinality--are permitted. This result covers assignment games with a continuum of players and includes combinations of several assignment games, such as housing and automobile markets.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kaneko, Mamoru ; Wooders, Myrna Holtz |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 25.1996, 2, p. 245-58
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Kaneko, Mamoru, (1985)
-
Kaneko, Mamoru, (1982)
-
Utility theories in cooperative games
Kaneko, Mamoru, (2004)
- More ...