The one-share-one-vote-rule and managerial compensation
Year of publication: |
1997
|
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Authors: | Teall, John L. |
Published in: |
Review of financial economics : RFE. - Medford, MA : Wiley, ISSN 1058-3300, ZDB-ID 1116477-3. - Vol. 6.1997, 2, p. 211-223
|
Subject: | Aktie | Share | Führungskräfte | Managers | Übernahme | Takeover | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Theorie | Theory | Vorzugsaktie | Preference share |
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