The optimal design of international trade institutions : uncertainty and escape
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Rosendorff, B. Peter ; Milner, Helen V. |
Published in: |
International organization : IO. - Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0020-8183, ZDB-ID 207420-5. - Vol. 55.2001, 4, p. 829-857
|
Subject: | safeguard clause | Handelsabkommen | Trade agreement | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Welt | World |
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