The Optimal Disclosure Policy When Firms Offer Implicit Contracts
Year of publication: |
[2007]
|
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Authors: | Mukherjee, Arijit |
Publisher: |
[2007]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Implizite Kontrakte | Implicit contracts | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (18 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 5, 2007 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.998540 [DOI] |
Classification: | C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; M5 - Personnel Economics |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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