The optimal monetary policy rule when the Central Bank has private information
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Røisland, Øistein |
Published in: |
Rules and institutional arrangements for monetary policy. - Oslo : Norges Bank, ISBN 82-7553-175-6. - 2000, p. 71-99
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility | Optimaler Währungsraum | Optimum currency area | Inflationssteuerung | Inflation targeting | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
Extent: | graph. Darst |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz im Buch ; Book section |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Literaturverz. S. 98 - 99 In: Rules and institutional arrangements for monetary policy |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Central bank credibility, independence, and monetary policy
Aguir, Abdelkader, (2018)
-
Bugarin, Mauricio Soares, (2019)
-
Hughes Hallett, Andrew, (2007)
- More ...
-
Real-time Data for Norway: Challenges for Monetary Policy
Bernhardsen, Tom, (2004)
-
Monetary policy when export revenues drop
Bergholt, Drago, (2022)
-
New Paradigms in Monetary Theory and Policy?
Balling, Morten, (2012)
- More ...