The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation
We propose a new continuous-time principal-agent model to study the optimal timing of stock-based incentives, when the effects of managerial actions materialize with a lag and are only progressively understood by shareholders. On the one hand, early contingent compensation hedges the manager against the accumulation of exogenous shocks. On the other hand, the fact that initial information asymmetries between the manager and shareholders are progressively resolved suggests that contingent compensation should be postponed. We introduce two possible types of managerial short-termism, and show that they both result in lower-powered incentives and more deferred compensation.
Year of publication: |
2010-08
|
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre |
Institutions: | Financial Markets Group |
Saved in:
freely available
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