The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). 'The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp. 116-121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Āzacis, Helmuts ; Collie, David R.
Publisher:	Cardiff : Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Subject:	Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Spieltheorie \| Strafe \| Kartell \| Theorie \| Optimal punishments \| Trigger strategies \| Collusion \| Cartels

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Series:	Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; E2007/27
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	550548203 [GVK] hdl:10419/83916 [Handle] RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2007/27 [RePEc]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322771