The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). 'The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames', Economics Letters 90, pp. 116-121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Azacis, Helmuts ; Collie, David R.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 105.2009, 1, p. 56-57
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Optimal punishments Trigger strategies Collusion Cartels

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023478