The Organizational Structure of Insurance Companies: The Role of Heterogeneous Risks and Guaranty Funds
We examine a market with observably heterogeneous risks and a government sponsored guaranty fund and consider whether it is optimal to form a single insurer or separate insurers for each consumer type. Given the economic environment, pooling never dominates the formation of separate insurance companies. This result provides an incentive for the phenomenon of insurance fleets. Copyright The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2007.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ligon, James A. ; Thistle, Paul D. |
Published in: |
Journal of Risk & Insurance. - American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA, ISSN 0022-4367. - Vol. 74.2007, 4, p. 851-862
|
Publisher: |
American Risk and Insurance Association - ARIA |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Adverse selection with frequency and severity risk : alternative risk-sharing provisions
Ligon, James Allen, (2008)
-
Moral hazard and background risk in competitive insurance markets
Ligon, James Allen, (2008)
-
A behavioral model of insurance pricing
Ligon, James Allen, (2007)
- More ...