The Origin of Competitive Strength : Fifty Years of the Auto Industry in Japan and the U.S

Online-Ressource (XXXIV, 278p)

online resource

Prologue - The Japanese Automobile Industry Gets on Its FeetMITI’s Automotive Strategy in the 1950s -- Rise of Independent Two-Wheeled and Three-Wheeled Vehicle Manufacturers -- The Shelving of the “People’s Car” Plan -- Recognition of the Need to Develop a Car for the Masses -- The First Definition of Productivity, and the Difference between Japan and the U.S -- I. Toyota Moves into the Fast Lane -- I-1. The Big Time - Launching Toyota’s American Operation -- I-2. Fifteen Long Years Establishing an American Base -- I-3. Overtaking the Datsun Bluebird -- I-4. Failure in Introducing an American-Style Distribution System -- I-5. The Product Planning Office at Toyota Motor Sales: Placing the Customer First -- I-6. Corolla vs. Sunny -- I-7. Foresight Behind the Development of the One-Box Van -- I-8. The Shock of My Years with General Motors -- I-9. The Revolutionary Celica Ordering System -- I-10. Development of Distribution Systems -- II. A Flagship Car -- II-1. MITI’s Shadowboxing -- II-2. Grappling with Emission Control Measures -- II-3. Look-Alike Cars: The Hidden Key to Success or Failure -- II-4. The God of Sales: President Kamiya -- II-5. Overtaking the Datsun Bluebird -- II-6. The Lexus -- III. Management of the Automobile Industries in Japan and the U.S. in the Postwar Period -- III-1. Characteristics of the Automobile Industry -- III-2. The Evils of the Big Three’s Oligopoly -- III-3. Comparison of the Management Performance of Toyota and GM in the Postwar Period -- III-4. Conclusion -- IV. The Success of NUMMI -- IV-1. Growing Popularity of Posts in NUMMI -- IV-2. An Unrealized Partnership between Toyota and Ford -- IV-3. Talks Quickly Shift to Toyota and GM -- IV-4. A Strong Desire to Achieve a Joint Venture -- IV-5. The Understanding and Cooperation of the UAW -- IV-6. Universality of the Toyota Production System is Proven -- V. GM’s Tough Fight -- V-1. The Big Three’s Late Comprehension of the Small-Car Market -- V-2. Corvair’s Setback -- V-3. The Vega and the Death of Ford-style Mass Production System -- V-4. Chevette’s Success -- V-5. The Tragedy of the X-Car -- V-6. The Collapse of the J-Car -- V-7. The Rejection of the S-Car -- V-8. The Vision of Saturn -- V-9. Hamtramck Plant Versus Tahara Plant -- V-10. The Key Reasons for Failure -- VI. The Rebirth of GM -- VI-1. Coup d’Etat by Outside Directors -- VI-2. Management Reform Under President Jack Smith -- VI-3. Overhaul of Product Planning -- VI-4. Production Startup Problems -- VI-5. Lean Production -- VI-6. Enhancing GM’s Technological Potential -- VI-7. Independence of Parts Suppliers -- VI-8. The New Purchasing Philosophy -- VI-9. Rebuilding the Domestic Sales Structure -- VI-10. Stepping Up Overseas Operations -- VII. Lean Production and the Challenge to the “World Car” -- VII-1. Ripple Effect of the MIT Study -- VII-2. The Toyota Production System and the Ford Production System -- VII-3. Competition and Production Leveling -- VII-4. GM Europe and Lean Production -- VII-5. World Car’s Conditions -- Epilogue -- The Arrival of the Black Ships -- The Automobile Industry and the Bubble Economy -- Developing the Technology Basis -- Addendum -- Japan-U.S. Auto Trade Negotiations -- Zero-Emission Vehicles -- The Progress of Electronic Science’s Application to the Auto Industry -- Increased Competition of Mini-Cars -- About the Author -- Reference.

10.1007/978-4-431-68419-0 [DOI]

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