The paradox of concessions in developing countries
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Bugarin, Mauricio Soares ; Ribeiro, Frederico |
Published in: |
Brazilian review of econometrics : BRE ; the review of the Brazilian Econometric Society. - Rio de Janeiro : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1980-2447, ZDB-ID 2392364-7. - Vol. 41.2021, 1, p. 69-100
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Subject: | game theory | mechanism design | airport concession | privatization in Latin America | Lateinamerika | Latin America | Flughafen | Airport | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Privatisierung | Privatization | Entwicklungsländer | Developing countries | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Öffentlich-private Partnerschaft | Public-private partnership |
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