The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877–1934
Whereas historical accounts of U.S. tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties, previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects. A formal model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters' preferences provides empirical equations to test for partisan effects. Subsequent time series analysis shows that, even after controlling for interest group demands, partisan control of government did significantly affect the tariff. Moreover, during the period under study, the two political parties enacted tariff policies that benefited different sets of producer groups at the expense of others. Thus, political institutions did play a significant role in shaping the interests that influence U.S. foreign economic policy.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Epstein, David ; O'Halloran, Sharyn |
Published in: |
International Organization. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 50.1996, 02, p. 301-324
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Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
Saved in:
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