The persistance of "bad" precedents and the need for communication: A coordination experiment
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Fehr, Dietmar |
Publisher: |
Berlin : Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |
Subject: | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Koordination | Kommunikation | Test | coordination | precedent | costly communication | cheap talk |
Series: | SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; 2011-039 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 663299543 [GVK] hdl:10419/56689 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L23 - Organization of Production |
Source: |
-
The Persistence of "Bad" Precedents and the Need for Communication: A Coordination Experiment
Fehr, Dietmar, (2011)
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The persistance of "bad" precedents and the need for communication : a coordination experiment
Fehr, Dietmar, (2011)
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