The Philosophy of Intransitive Preference.
This paper argues against the proposition that rationality necessarily requires preferences to be transitive. Attention is given predominantly to the logic of the arguments purporting to show that rational agents must adhere to transitivity. The paper builds on previous work in the area of economics and philosophy by clarifying and sharpening the normative case for and against this basic assumption. Copyright 1993 by Royal Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1993
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Authors: | Anand, Paul |
Published in: |
Economic Journal. - Royal Economic Society - RES, ISSN 1468-0297. - Vol. 103.1993, 417, p. 337-46
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Publisher: |
Royal Economic Society - RES |
Saved in:
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