The political economy of corporate governance in developing economies: The case of Bangladesh
The paper investigates the influence of concentrated shareholding, boardroom politics and interest group politics in the quality of corporate governance in listed firms. It finds that the controlling shareholders exert influence in boardroom politics through family-aligned board and executive management. The evidence shows that concentrated ownership, family-aligned board and management, and political connection(s) of the controlling shareholder(s) tend to be inversely associated with the quality of corporate governance in a firm. The findings of the study suggest that the broad-based interest group politics which influence both political preference and corporate control politics contribute significantly to the current state of corporate governance in developing economies.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Haque, Faizul ; Arun, Thankom ; Kirkpatrick, Colin |
Published in: |
Research in International Business and Finance. - Elsevier, ISSN 0275-5319. - Vol. 25.2011, 2, p. 169-182
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Corporate governance Political economy Interest group politics Asia Bangladesh |
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