The political economy of discretionary monetary policy : a public choice analysis of proposals for reform
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Burdekin, Richard C. K. ; Westbrook, Jilleen R. ; Willett, Thomas D. |
Published in: |
Money and the nation state : the financial revolution, government and the world monetary system. - New Brunswick, NJ [u.a.] : Transaction Publ., ISBN 1-56000-930-6. - 1998, p. 331-350
|
Subject: | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Institutionenökonomik | Institutional economics | Inflation | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Theorie | Theory | OECD-Staaten | OECD countries |
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