The Political Economy of Government Debt

This paper critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal fiscal policy. We also discuss numerical rules or institutional designs which might lead to a moderation of these distortions

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Alesina, Alberto F.
Other Persons:	Passalacqua, Andrea (contributor)
Publisher:	[2015]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Schulden \| Public debt \| Welt \| World \| Finanzpolitik \| Fiscal policy \| Neue Institutionenökonomik \| New institutional economics

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (76 p)
Series:	NBER Working Paper ; No. w21821
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 2015 erstellt
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013009903