The political economy of Kosher Wars

In this paper we develop a theory of â€œKosher Warsâ€ under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbiâ€™s rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under Americaâ€™s voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Epstein, Gil S. ; Gang, Ira N.
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Rent Seeking \| Judentum \| Theorie \| Europa \| USA \| Ernährungsverhalten \| dietary restrictions \| Kashrut \| kosher \| religion \| rent-seeking

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2002-27
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	359748023 [GVK] hdl:10419/79187 [Handle] RePEc:rut:rutres:200227 [RePEc]
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; Z12 - Religion
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318373