The Political Economy of Public Debt

We survey recent theories of public debt that incorporate political decision making in rich dynamic environments. These theories provide a new framework with which to interpret empirical evidence and to assess institutional reforms that may help control political inefficiencies. We discuss the inefficiencies that lead to overaccumulation of debt and their implications for the long-run distribution of debt.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Battaglini, Marco
Published in:	Annual Review of Economics. - Annual Reviews, ISSN 1941-1383. - Vol. 3.2011, 1, p. 161-189
Publisher:	Annual Reviews
Subject:	fiscal policy \| constitutional design \| legislative bargaining \| electoral rules \| balanced budget rule

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822967