The Politics of Persuasion when Voters are Rational
A democratic society is considered where the voters, but not the politicians, are uncertain about how the economy works. The parties therefore have a strategic motive to misinform the voters. Will the voters learn how the economy works and will the policy decisions be efficient? It turns out that the degree of polarization of the political parties is crucial. If the parties are very polarized, voters will not trust the parties and the policy will not reflect how the economy actually works.
Authors: | : Christian Schultz |
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Institutions: | Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet |
Subject: | economic models of political processes | social choice studies | voting |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in: Journal of Economics, 1995, 97(3) pp 357-368 Number 93-15 19 pages |
Classification: | D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749820
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