The Power of Whispers: A Theory of Rumor, Communication and Revolution
We study the role rumors play in revolutions using a global game model. Agents with diverse private information rationally evaluate the informativeness of rumors about the regime strength. Without communication among agents, wild rumors are discounted and agents are generally less responsive to rumors than to trustworthy news. When agents can exchange views on the informativeness of rumors, a rumor against the regime would coordinate a larger mass of attackers than that without communication. The effect of communication can be so large that rumors can have a greater impact on mobilization than does fully trustworthy information.
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Lu, Yang ; Suen, Wing ; Chen, Heng |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Saved in:
freely available
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