The Prediction Value
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues – including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value – can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.
Year of publication: |
2013-11-25
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Authors: | Koster, Maurice ; Kurz, Sascha ; Lindner, Ines ; Napel, Stefan |
Institutions: | Tinbergen Instituut |
Subject: | influence | voting games | cooperative games | Banzhaf value | Shapley value |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 13-188/II |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256041