The Price of Survival : The Origins and Outcomes of Decentralization in Qing China, 1850-1894

Why do absolutists decentralize power to others? We developed a signaling game model to analyze the decentralization under an authoritarian regime. The model reveals that strong rulers prefer to not offer any power decentralization, while weak rulers tend to disguise themselves as strong rulers but are still forced to offer power decentralization when they face strong threats. Moreover, the model also shows that local governments (governors) are less likely to cooperate with the ruler when they have stronger power. We assess the theory using historical evidence from late nineteen century China around the time of a political shift from centralization to decentralization and finds that domestic wars (Taiping Rebellion) played an important role in shaping the late Qing China’s decentralization. Our model implications also contribute to the discussion of Qing empire’s military failures in interstate competitions after mid-19th century from the ruler-governor game perspective, as well as the self-strengthening movement in late Qing China