The Principal's Moral Hazard : Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy
Year of publication: |
[2010]
|
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Authors: | Whitford, Andrew B. |
Publisher: |
[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Description of contents: | Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol. 17, Issue 2, pp. 213-233, 2007 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 2007 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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