The pro-collusive effect of increasing the repose period for price fixing agreements

Jeroen Hinloopen

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proofs this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Hinloopen, Jeroen
Publisher:	Rotterdam [u.a.] : Tinbergen Inst.
Subject:	Cartel stability \| detection probabilities \| statue of limitation \| Kartell \| Cartel \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy \| Preisführer \| Price leadership \| Wettbewerbsbeschränkung \| Restraints of competition

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Extent:	Online-Ressource (11 S.)
Series:	Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute. - Rotterdam [u.a.] : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 0929-0834, ZDB-ID 2435783-2. - Vol. 2005,104
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/86354 [Handle]
Classification:	K21 - Antitrust Law ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346460