The public good index when some voters are incompatible
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Alonso-Meijide, J. M. ; Casas-Méndez, B. |
Published in: |
Homo oeconomicus. - München : Accedo Verl.-Ges., ISSN 0943-0180, ZDB-ID 626351-3. - Vol. 24.2007, 3/4, p. 449-468
|
Subject: | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Noncooperative game | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game | Index | Index number | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Theorie | Theory |
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