The Quality of Earnings Information in Dual-Class Firms : Persistence and Predictability

A dual-class firm structure, in which one class of shares confers more votes per share than the other, creates a gap between voting rights and cash flow rights. In this paper, we examine the quality of the financial reports of dual- versus single-class firms publicly traded in the U.S. over the 2012–2017 period, as measured by persistence and predictive ability of earnings and cash flows. The results are based on comprehensive information from financial statements analyzed using across-sample and within-sample tests. An additional external indicator of financial restatement filings is also used to support the results. The findings demonstrate that the quality of financial reports is higher for dual-class firms than for single-class firms and increases over time. This suggests that the freedom from market pressures is stronger than agency costs, encouraging founders to provide investors with higher-quality information in exchange for superior voting rights. The results uncover important and counterintuitive evidence about the existence of a tradeoff between the dilution of voting rights and enhancement of the credibility of information provided to investors