The ratchet principle in a principal agent game with unknown costs : an experimental analysis
Year of publication: |
1998
|
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Authors: | Chaudhuri, Ananish |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 37.1998, 3, p. 291-304
|
Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Experiment | Theorie | Theory |
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