The Regulation of Entry

August 2001 - New data show that countries that regulate the entry of new firms more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods. The evidence supports the view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. Djankov and his coauthors present new data on the regulation of the entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official costs that a start-up firm must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries that regulate entry more heavily have greater corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality goods (public or private). Countries with more democratic and limited governments regulate entry more lightly. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that regulating entry benefits politicians and bureaucrats. This paper—a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department—is part of a larger effort in the department to educate policymakers on the costs of regulation. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The Regulation of Small Businesses