The relevance of private information in mechanism design
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Neeman, Zvika |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 117.2004, 1, p. 55-77
|
Subject: | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Ökonomische Rente | Economic rent | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
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