The Restricted Core for Totally Positive Games with Ordered Players
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | van den Brink, René ; van der Laan, Gerard ; Vasil'ev, Valeri |
Publisher: |
Amsterdam and Rotterdam : Tinbergen Institute |
Subject: | Transferable Utility Games | Core | Shapley-Wert | Verhandlungstheorie | Theorie | Totally positive TU-game | Harsanyi dividends | Shapley value | Harsanyi set | Selectope | Digraph | River game |
Series: | Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; 09-038/1 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 838752470 [GVK] hdl:10419/86809 [Handle] RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20090038 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games |
Source: |
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The restricted core for totally positive games with ordered players
Brink, René van den, (2009)
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The Restricted Core for Totally Positive Games with Ordered Players
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