The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

In the context of common agency adverse-selection games weillustrate that the revelation principle cannot be applied to studyequilibria of the multi-principal games. We then demonstrate thatan extension of the taxation principle - what we term the delegation principle - can be used to characterize the set of allcommon agency equilibria.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Martimort, David ; Stole, Lars
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	revelation principle \| delegation principle \| taxationprinciple \| common agency \| adverse selection.

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 575
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	843625740 [GVK] hdl:10419/75842 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_575 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315204