The right to quit work : an efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Müller, Daniel ; Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 184.2021, p. 653-669
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Subject: | Efficiency wages | Incentive theory | Labor contracts | Law and economics | Moral hazard | Theorie | Theory | Effizienzlohn | Moral Hazard | Arbeitsvertrag | Labour contract | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragsrecht | Contract law |
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