The Role of Beliefs and Confidence in Building Social Networks
We examine the process of building social relationships in a non-cooperative game where such link formation is costly and requires mutual consent. We provide a noncooperative foundation for several link-based network stability concepts that have been studied in the literature on network formation. In our model players form myopic beliefs about the feasibility of building direct relationships with their acquaintances. These beliefs represent how each neighbor of a player is expected to respond to the initiation of a link by that player. We introduce a stability concept called “monadic stability” where agents play a best response to their formed myopic beliefs such that these beliefs are self-confirming. The resulting equilibrium networks form a class of networks that are shown to have some very appealing properties.
Authors: | Sarangi, Sudipta ; Gilles, Robert P. |
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Institutions: | Department of Economics, Ourso College of Business |
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