The role of equity compensation in reducing inefficient investment in labor
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sualihu, Mohammed Aminu ; Rankin, Michaela ; Haman, Janto |
Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 66.2021, p. 1-25
|
Subject: | Empire-building | Executive compensation | Labor investment | Restricted stock | Risk-aversion | Stock options | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Managervergütung | Börsenkurs | Share price |
-
Lovett, Steve, (2022)
-
How important are risk-taking incentives in executive compensation?
Dittmann, Ingolf, (2017)
-
Hou, Wanrong, (2020)
- More ...
-
The role of agency costs in the voluntary adoption of XBRL-based financial reporting
De Martinis, Michael, (2020)
-
Payment behaviour of electricity consumers : evidence from the Greater Accra Region of Ghana
Sualihu, Mohammed Aminu, (2014)
-
Religiosity, CEO Overconfidence, and Labor investment Decisions
Khedmati, Mehdi, (2020)
- More ...