The role of information in repeated games with frequent actions
Year of publication: |
2006-12-03
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Authors: | Sannikov, Yuliy ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
Subject: | repeated games | dynamic incentives | frequent moves |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series 2006 Meeting Papers Number 871 |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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